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Abstract
This paper examines the determinants and margins of profit shifting through transfer
pricing. We develop a theory model, where transfer pricing patterns are governed by a
generalized concealment cost function (CCF). Our empirical analysis draws on micro-
level data about transaction-level imports, firm-level characteristics, as well as tax differ-
entials between regions in Switzerland and countries abroad. We find, both theoretically
and empirically, that more productive multinational firms trade an increased quantity of
goods, while deviating less from the arms’ length price. Moreover, the decision of firms
to engage in transfer pricing depends negatively on a fixed cost component in the CCF,
as well as trade costs. The model allows us to estimate a theory-consistent concealment
cost function, which can be used for counterfactual analysis.
JEL classification : F23; H25; H26; H32.
Key Words : Multinational firms; tax avoidance; tax havens; transfer
pricing.
∗Affiliation: ETH Zurich. Address: ETH Zürich, KOF, Leonhardstrasse 21, LEE G 118, 8092 Zurich,
Switzerland. E-mail: lassmann@kof.ethz.ch
†Affiliation: ETH Zürich. Address: ETH Zürich, KOF, Leonhardstrasse 21, LEE G 131, 8092 Zurich,
Switzerland. E-mail: rydzek@kof.ethz.ch.
1
1 Introduction
Tax harmonization and compliance initiatives have been prominent on the international in-
stitutional agenda in recent years. Several bilateral and multilateral tax-authority initiatives
– in particular the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting package (BEPS) – aim at
collaborating on the matter of tax avoidance, which multinational enterprises (MNE) have
been repeatedly accused of.
In this paper, we analyze the forces that govern the pattern of transfer pricing, one widely
used methods of profit shifting. In fact, previous literature has found evidence for transfer
mis-pricing (see Bernard et al., 2006; Davies et al., 2014; Cristea, 2015). However, the factors
that foster transfer mis-pricing are not entirely disentangled to date. Specifically, which
factors determine (i) the decision of firms to engage in transfer pricing, i.e., the extensive
margin, (ii) the extent of profits shifted, i.e., the intensive margin, (iii) different transfer
pricing strategies, i.e., firms may shift a given amount of profits to locations with lower
corporate tax rates by either shipping small volumes at prices vastly different from the
competitive arm’s length price (ALP), by shipping large quantities at prices very similar to
the ALP, or by any combination of the two. We argue that firm heterogeneity is crucial in
explaining these different factors. Especially, for the trade-off between quantity and deviation
of the transfer price from the ALP, which is involved in a firm’s optimization problem. In this
regard, we investigate the effect of firm heterogeneity in terms of productivity, transportation
costs, the difference in corporate income tax rates on import quantities, prices, and import
volumes, utilizing data about the universe of import transactions to a tax haven, Switzerland.
We contribute to the literature along four main lines. First, we generalize the concealment
cost function by proposing a theory framework in which transfer prices deviate from arm’s
length prices for a tax avoidance motive.1 Second, by introducing firm heterogeneity in
terms of productivity in our theoretical model we examine the determinants of transfer
pricing along extensive and intensive margins of transfer pricing. Third, the model allows
for a theory-consistent estimation of concealment cost function parameters, which can be
used for counterfactual analysis within our model framework. Analyzing how variations in
tax differentials, trade costs, or trade policy instruments affect tax evasion or limit transfer
pricing might be an important policy tool. Fourth, we employ detailed information about
the universe of Swiss firm-level manufacturing import transactions between 2006 and 2013
in our empirical analysis. The dataset used for the empirical analysis offers several benefits.
1Concealment costs are the costs that arise due to engaging in transfer pricing, i.e., paying accountants,
dealing with tax authorities, etc.
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Due to low corporate taxes and a favorable economic and institutional environment with
generous tax privileges for certain legal forms, Switzerland is a highly attractive location for
foreign-owned MNEs. At the same time, Switzerland is a major location for domestically
owned MNEs (for an overview see Egger and Koethenbuerger, 2016). The focus on a single
importer country allows us to hold pricing-to-market constant. We are able to use both the
variation in corporate income tax rates across local jurisdictions in Switzerland and across
exporter countries to determine how tax differentials affect profit shifting under else constant
importer conditions. Lastly, we use name matching to identify within firm transactions.
Thus, in contrast to the recent literature on transfer pricing we are able to exploit the
variation within a firm to clearly identify mis-pricing.
Similar to Davies et al. (2014) we develop a theoretical model in which transfer pricing is
explicitly governed by concealment costs, assuming that firms mis-price transfers because
they want to avoid taxes. Firms produce differentiated goods and have monopoly power for
their variety. They either produce the inputs needed for the differentiated good themselves
in the domestic country, or they import them from a foreign affiliate. The latter makes
profit shifting possible. Firms face three restrictions to engage in transfer pricing. First,
concealment costs have a fixed component and are increasing in the deviation from the
competitive price as well as the traded quantity of goods. Second, as inputs have to be used
in the production process there is an implicit maximum of inputs that can be used without
cannibalizing the domestic monopoly profits. Third, high trade costs might render transfer
pricing infeasible, especially for small tax differentials. We find that a certain productivity
threshold is necessary for firms to engage in profit shifting, which is due to the fixed cost
component in the concealment cost function and varies between countries due to country-
pair-specific iceberg trade costs. While higher fixed costs are intuitively associated with
decreased entry, the role of trade costs is more subtle. Firms will only shift profits if the
gains from profit shifting (in terms of net profits) are sufficiently large to compensate for
transportation costs. The net gains from transfer pricing depend on the tax differential: the
larger it is the greater are the potential gains. On the other hand the costs of transfer pricing
increase with transportation costs because goods need to be traded to be able to exploit the
tax differential. This implies that both the tax differential and the trade cost-adjusted tax
differential matter. Trade cost can even be so high that they become prohibitive for transfer
pricing. Thus, the global decline of transportation costs might play a significant role in the
rise of transfer pricing.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the related literature. Section 3
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provides an overview of corporate taxation in Switzerland. Section 4 outlines the theoretical
model. In section 5 we describe the data and the empirical estimation strategy. Finally,
section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
A large strand of the public finance literature focuses on profit shifting (see Huizinga and
Laeven, 2008; Schindler and Schjelderup, 2013; Dharmapala, 2014), as well as channels
through which MNEs reduce their corporate tax payments. In fact, empirical evidence has
shown that MNEs avoid taxation by shifting profits to low tax countries (e.g. Clausing, 2009;
Dyreng et al., 2012; Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013; Egger et al., 2014). For instance, the
results in Egger et al. (2010) suggest that, among European firms, the absolute tax payments
of MNEs are lower than those of comparable firms that only operate domestically. The main
instruments used for profit shifting are transfer pricing (see Bernard et al., 2006; Davies
et al., 2014), debt shifting (see Egger et al., 2014), and royalty payments (see Karkinsky
and Riedel, 2012; Griffith et al., 2014 among others). Bernard et al. (2006) and Davies et
al. (2014) have shown for the US and France, respectively, that deviations of the transfer
price from ALP are related to differences in taxes. The former show that the price wedge
depends on product differentiation, firm size, market power, destination-country tax rates,
and import tariffs for MNEs in the US, and the latter show that the biggest French MNEs
consistently use price transfers.
These findings imply that transfer pricing is an important instrument for multinational firms’
tax avoidance practices, and that intensive local multinational activity creates some leeway
for profit shifting. The OECD (2010) states the problem underlying the use of transfer
prices as a vehicle for profit shifting: "When independent enterprises deal with each other,
the conditions of their commercial and financial relations (e.g., the price of goods transferred
or services provided and the conditions of the transfer or provision) ordinarily are determined
by market forces. When associated enterprises deal with each other, their commercial and
financial relations may not be directly affected by external market forces in the same way."
Indeed MNEs may use sophisticated methods, for instance, by engaging in manipulation of
the arm’s length price to conceal deviations in the transfer price (Cristea and Nguyen, 2016)
for tax reasons. Even without mis-pricing intent, Bauer and Langenmayr (2013) argue that
MNEs are more productive and hence the marginal cost for an intra-firm transaction is lower
than that of an independently sourced input. Additionally, the latter involves a bargaining
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mark-up, which can render it relatively more expensive. In Keuschnigg and Devereux (2013),
financial frictions distort the transfer price. All these factors render the empirical analysis
of transfer pricing practices difficult. The next section discusses the institutional setup in
Switzerland that fosters profit shifting, in particular transfer pricing.
3 Corporate Taxes and Profit Shifting in Switzerland
The topic of tax-induced profit shifting of MNEs is a highly debated one, having substantial
quantitative implications with respect to the potential losses for national tax authorities. For
instance, the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal decided in 2008 that Roche Prod-
ucts Pty Limited Australia, a subsidiary of Roche Holdings Ltd of Basel, Switzerland had
overpaid 45 million dollar for its ethical pharmaceutical products to Roche Basel (Switzer-
land) between 1993 and 2003.
Switzerland has a residence-based corporate tax system such that companies are subject to
corporate income tax on worldwide income, with the exception of income attributable to
foreign permanent establishments or foreign immobile property. Low corporate tax rates in
general and privileged taxation of holding companies, administrative companies and mixed
companies on a cantonal level (similar to US state level) in Switzerland as well as its repu-
tation as a tax haven, provide an incentive for MNEs to use transfer pricing, among other
methods, in order to avoid taxes. Although the privileged taxation is supposed to be abol-
ished through a current corporate tax reform to be put in place by 2018 or 2019, the period
under consideration in this paper still falls under current practices.2
– Table 1 about here –
Table 1 summarizes the 26 Swiss cantonal corporate profit tax rates for different forms of
legal persons. It is evident that the variation in tax rates is large, and the lowest rates apply
in central Switzerland, amounting to little more than 12 percent. The highest tax rates apply
in Western Switzerland and Basle, amounting to about 24 percent in Geneva. The average
tax rate is 17.9 percent.
Profits are supposed to be taxed in the location in which the value added was generated. In
general market forces present in transactions between two independent firms should enforce
the aforementioned principle. Thus, transactions between two independent firms should be
2Tax privileges for MNEs will be substituted by a decrease in corporate tax rates as well as other benefits
more in line with the OECD BEPS package. This includes improved bilateral and multilateral cooperation
to diminish profit shifting. In addition, bank secrecy for foreign clients will be abolished at around the same
time, hence it is questionable whether Switzerland can be considered a tax haven in the future.
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priced at arm’s length. In contrast, multinational firms may exploit a lack of market forces
(within the firm) to shift profits to low tax countries by pricing this internal transactions
different from the ALP. This involves undercharging for inputs sourced from affiliated firms
located in high tax countries, and/or overcharging inputs supplied from affiliated firms in low
tax countries. The identification of mis-priced transactions is thus empirically challenging.
Comparable goods may not be available in the data, especially for specialized industries such
as watches and jewelery, and the pharmaceutical industry, which are important sectors for
the Swiss economy. Especially the pharmaceutical industry is a highly regulated market,
including the regulation of prices.3 Accordingly it is not peculiar per se, that transfer prices
deviate from arm’s length prices.
4 Model
In this section we provide a model of transfer pricing between two affiliated firms located in
country i = d, f , where d indicates the domestic country and f the foreign country. Without
loss of generality we write the model from the perspective of a firm in the domestic country
that potentially has affiliates in the foreign country. Both countries differ in their corporate
tax rates, τi ∈ [0, 1]. Firms are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity, φ, which is
drawn from a known distribution. Firms produce differentiated goods indexed by ω. For
simplicity we assume that the differentiated goods can only be produced and consumed lo-
cally in the domestic country, but firms are able to use inputs produced by domestic affiliates
and/or import inputs provided from a foreign affiliate. Thus, the foreign affiliate does not
produce any differentiated goods and its sole purpose is to decrease the effective tax rate of
the domestic firm.4 We denote the domestic input as xd and the foreign input as xf . Both
are perfect substitutes in the production process. Profit shifting by transfer pricing arises
from the fact that an input can be imported from a foreign affiliated firm and its price can
be set differently from the market price.
Concealment costs
If a firm decides to source inputs from a foreign affiliated firm, it may engage in transfer
mis-pricing, i.e., shifting profits towards the country with the lower corporate tax rate.
3The Swiss pharmaceutical industry contributes about 6% to the Swiss GDP and accounts for about 30%
of exports.
4Allowing for foreign production and even trade in differentiated goods, as in Helpman et al. (2004) does
not change the analysis, but greatly increases the model complexity as it introduces further entry cutoffs and
makes aggregation more difficult.
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As in Davies et al. (2014) firms can shift profits towards low tax countries by exporting
(importing) intermediate inputs above (below) the market price. As this kind of mis-pricing
usually violates tax laws, the firm incurs concealment costs.5
Depending on the tax differentials firms either want to import goods below or above the
arms’ length price. Thus, we specify two generalized concealment cost functions: (i) one in
which the foreign firm undercharges their inputs, i.e., the corporate tax rate in the domestic
country is lower than in the domestic country, and (ii) one for a foreign firms that overcharges,
i.e., the foreign corporate tax rate is lower than the domestic one.
In our model, concealment costs consist of two parts, a variable part and a fixed part. The
firm has to pay some fixed cost, FU and FO, if the firm uses undercharging or overcharging,
respectively. The variable part depends positively on the difference between the transfer
price and the competitive price, and the total amount of goods shipped. If the transfer price
and the competitive price differ significantly, the firm may be audited by the tax authority
and needs to justify this difference, which increases costs. If a firm exports high quantities,
this can imply greater profit shifting and tax authorities might demand more documentation,
i.e., greater exports/imports might raise the suspicion of tax authorities. The concealment
costs for undercharging transfer pricing are
(pA − pU )αxβf + FU , (1)
where pU is the undercharging price of an internal transaction, which is lower than the
competitive price pA, and β, α ≥ 0. If the firm overcharges, i.e., the transfer price of input
pO is higher than the competitive market price, the concealment costs are
(pO − pA)αxβf + FO. (2)
In contrast to Cristea and Nguyen (2016) firms take the competitive arms’ length price as
given. Thus, instead of strategically setting pA and pU (pO) to reduce concealment costs,
the firm only sets the price wedge between the arms’ length price and the internal transfer
price pU or pO by choosing the optimal pU and pO, respectively.6
Utility
5These costs might include paying transfer pricing accountants, preparing documentation, and legal fees.
6In the Appendix A we show that very similar concealment cost functions can be derived using an optimal
acting tax authority that maximizes expected fines.
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Individuals (in the domestic country) have linear-quadratic preferences as in Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008):
U = q0 + e
∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)dω − 12b
(∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)dω
)2
− 12c
∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)2dω, (3)
where q0 is a numeraire, q(ω) is the quantity of a differentiated good indicated by ω from
the set Ω of available goods in the domestic country, and e, b, and c are positive constants.
The aggregate market demand is
p(ω) = e− b
∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)dω − cq(ω), (4)
where we assume that the mass of individuals in the economy is normalized to one. We
define the aggregate price of all products as
P ≡
∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)dω, (5)
and hence
P ≡
(
e− b
∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)dω
)
M − c
∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)dω, (6)
where M ≡ ∫ω∈Ω dω is equal to the total number of products in the economy. Then we can
write
∫
ω∈Ω q(ω)dω = eM−Pc+bM , and the (aggregate) demand for a product ω is linear and given
by
p(ω) = E − cq(ω), (7)
where E ≡ ec+bPc+bM . Without loss of generality we normalize c to one.
Firms
Firms face monopolistic competition in their goods market as in standard Krugman (1980)
and Melitz (2003) models. Each differentiated good ω is produced using domestic inputs
xd and/or foreign inputs xf , which are perfect substitutes in the production process. All
domestic parent firms have the same technology to produce the differentiated goods using
the two inputs:
y(ω) = xf + xd. (8)
Firms are heterogeneous in terms of the productivity to produce inputs, xd and xf . Their
input productivity, φ, is drawn from a known distribution with cumulative density function
G(φ). We assume that firms can produce one unit of input xd and xf , respectively at costs
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1/φ in both countries. As the productivity of foreign affiliates and the domestic parent firm
is the same, there is no reason for firms to source any input from abroad. In this stylized
model input sourcing from abroad will be exclusively driven by tax considerations.7
In our basic model two types of firms exists. First, a firm that only sources domestically.
Second, a firm that sources from a foreign affiliate, but at a price below (above) the arm’s
length price, i.e., it uses transfer mis-pricing to shift profits to locations with lower tax rates.
Domestic firm
Net profits of a firm that only operates domestically, sources its inputs domestically, and
sells its differentiated good in the domestic market, are:
pid(ω) = (1− τd)
(
p(ω)y(ω)− xd
φ
)
− F, (9)
where we use that for an exclusively domestically sourcing firm, y(ω) = xd. F denotes fixed
entry costs. The (internal) costs of the firm for its inputs is 1/φ. Because each firm has a
monopoly in its market, the demand for inputs xd is given by
xd =
Eφ− 1
2φ , (10)
which is increasing in φ. Then the necessary productivity to cover the fixed cost F and to
enter the domestic market is given by
φ ≥
(
E − 2
√
F
1− τd
)−1
. (11)
Undercharging MNE
Assuming that the domestic tax rate is lower than the foreign tax rate, τd < τf . In this case
firms want to shift profits from the foreign high-tax country towards the domestic low-tax
7We could allow firms to have two independent draws from the G(φ) distribution, the first one for the
domestic productivity, φd, the second one for the foreign productivity φf . Thus, G(φd > φf ) gives the
probability of domestic sourcing without the possibility of transfer pricing, where  ≥ 1 are iceberg trade
costs. Introducing transfer pricing will alter this relationship. The tax differential between the domestic and
foreign country might render importing inputs more profitable. Thus, the foreign productivity draw necessary
for importing might be lower, and everything else equal more firms will import from foreign affiliates. Or the
fixed costs of the concealment cost function are so high that φ

< φˆ, where φˆ is necessary productivity of a
firm to use transfer pricing. In this case we have three types of firm: (i) firms that only source domestically,
with the lowest productivity, (ii) firms that source from abroad but at ALP, with intermediate productivity,
and (iii) firms that import from the foreign country at a price lower (higher) than the arm’s length price.
Disregarding the (ii) options simplifies the model.
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country. Thus, the firm will import intermediates inputs below the arms’ length price, i.e.,
undercharge. Total consolidated (foreign and domestic) net profits of the firm are:
piU (ω) =(1− τd)
(
p(ω)y(ω)− xd
φ
− pU xf
)
+(1− τf )
(
pU − 1
φ
)
xf − (1− τf )(pA − pU )αxβf − FU − F,
(12)
where gross profits generated by the domestic entity are revenues less domestically produced
inputs and undercharged foreign input costs. The gross profits (losses) of the foreign entity
are the revenues from the undercharged exports less the production costs. The term (pA −
pU )αxβf−FU reflects the concealment costs, which further decrease consolidated profits. Note
that the fixed costs, F , are not deductible. Without loss of generality we assume that the
concealment costs are paid by the entity with the higher tax rate to even further decrease
profits in the high-tax location. Note that if a firm wants to use foreign imports (to make use
of transfer pricing), they face iceberg trade costs  ≥ 1. These trade costs imply a constraint
to shift profits, i.e., the net profit gains of transfer pricing must be sufficiently high to pay
for the fixed costs, FU , and the inefficiency created by the presence of iceberg trade costs.
We use the fact that firms have monopoly power and that y(ω) = xd +xf , to derive the first
order conditions of the firm’s maximization problem:
∂pi(ω)U
∂xd
=0 → E − 2(xd + xf )− 1
φ
= 0,
∂pi(ω)U
∂xf
=0 → (1− τd) (E − 2(xd + xf )− pU ) + (1− τf )
(
pU − 1
φ
)
− (1− τf )(pA − pU )αβxβ−1f = 0,
∂pi(ω)U
∂pU
=0 → −(1− τd)xf + (1− τf )xf + (1− τf )α(pA − pU )α−1xβf = 0.
The optimal undercharging price, pU , is given by
pU =
α
β − α
(
β
α
pA − τf − τd
φζ
)
, (13)
where ζ = (1−τd)− (1−τf ) is the trade costs adjusted tax differential. Note that if τd < τf
and  ≥ 1, then ζ > 0.
In order to shift profits, the undercharging price needs to satisfy 0 ≤ pU ≤ 1φ . The first
inequality rules out negative prices, the second inequality states that the undercharging price
must be smaller than the cost of the affiliate, 1φ , otherwise no profits would been shifted.
While the second inequality always holds, given that pA = 1φ ,  ≥ 1 and α > β, the first
inequality constrains firms’ pricing behavior. If pA = 1φ and α > β, we need ζ <
α
β (τf − τd)
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to ensure that 0 ≤ pU . Solving the inequality for  yields:
 ≤ α
β
τf − τd
1− τd +
1− τf
1− τd , (14)
where the right hand side (RHS) is always greater than 1. Notice that the RHS is increasing
in τd and decreasing in τf , i.e., it increases in the tax differential between the two countries.
If transportation costs are too high relative to the tax differential, the firm wants to set a
negative price to be able to shift profits, i.e., the exporter is actually paying the importer
for the intermediate goods. We assume that this case transfer pricing is not feasible.
Assuming that  is sufficiently small, such that for a firm with given productivity φ the
undercharging price is positive, and α > β, we can show that
∂(pA − pU )/∂φ < 0, ∂(pA − pU )/∂ > 0,
∂(pA − pU )/∂τf > 0, ∂(pA − pU )/∂τd < 0.
Thus, more productive firms charge lower prices, but deviate less from the competitive price.
On the other hand firm deviate more if the tax differential is greater, holding productivity
constant. Last, higher trade costs increase the price wedge.
Similarly we derive the optimal traded quantity is
xUf =
(
(1− τd)− (1− τf )
(1− τf )α(pA − pU )α−1
) 1
β−1
. (15)
Substituting the optimal undercharging price, pU , from equation (13) yields
xUf =
 (1− τd)− (1− τf )
(1− τf )α
(
α
α−β
(
pA − τf−τdφζ
))α−1

1
β−1
. (16)
Assuming that pA = 1φ , an interior solution, (xf , Xd > 0), and 1 < β < α, it can be shown
that ∂xUf /∂φ > 0. Thus, bigger (more productive) firms trade more goods. Moreover, we
find that
∂xUf /∂τf > 0, ∂xUf /∂τd < 0, ∂xUf /∂ < 0.
Every thing else equal, a higher foreign tax rate (higher tax differential) incentivizes a firm
trade more goods to shift profits. Moreover firm deviate more from the competitive price,
thus total profits shifted increase with the tax differential. Given that α > β and an inte-
rior solution, more productive firms will deviate less from the arms’ length price and instead
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use more quantity. With increasing productivity firms substitute price deviation for quantity.
In the Appendix B we explicitly derive the analogous expression for an overcharging MNE.
The overcharging price is given by
pO =
β
β − α
(
pA +
α
β
τd − τf
φζ
)
. (17)
Note that the overcharging price has to be higher than the arms’ length price, which is the
case if ζ ≤ 0. Solving for  we get an analogous condition to equation (14) for the feasibility
of profit shifting in the presence of iceberg trade costs:
 <
1− τf
1− τd , (18)
where the RHS is greater than one as τd > τf . Similarly to the undercharging case trans-
portation costs limit transfer pricing if the tax differential is too small. The optimal quantity
is
xOf =
( (1− τf )− (1− τd)
(1− τd)α(pO − pA)α−1
) 1
β−1
. (19)
Binding non-negativity constraint
Also the assumption that E is sufficiently large to ensure that xd, xf > 0 might seem trivial,
yet it has important implications for the model. If the domestic demand for the differentiated
good of a firm is small, only limited amounts of inputs can be used in the production. This
limits the profit shifting capabilities of a firm. If profit shifting is optimal and E is not
sufficiently large, we are in a corner solution with xd = 0. In this case the firm will source all
its inputs from abroad, still maximizing local profits, i.e., the firm behaves like a monopolist
in the domestic market. Thus, the optimal inputs with a binding non-negativity constraint
on xd are given by
x˜f =
(
φE − 
2φ
)
. (20)
The first order condition becomes
∂pi(ω)U
∂pU
= 0 → −(1− τd)+ (1− τf ) + (1− τf )α(pA − pU )α−1xˆβ−1f = 0,
which implies that ∂(pA−pU )∂φ > 0. More productive firms deviate more from the arms’ length
price. The only possibility to shift more profits is to change the price wedge, e.g., lower pU .
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Moreover, for constraint firms we will not observe any quantity adjustments, as they always
use the maximum amounts of inputs. Thus, firm’s with a binding non-negativity constraint
will introduce a downward bias in the price difference estimation and in the quantity esti-
mation.
Extensive margin
Firms face two constraints when using transfer pricing for reasons of tax avoidance. First,
the transfer price has to satisfy the two conditions given by equations (14) and (18). These
relate the tax differential to the iceberg trade costs, . Figure 1 depicts the relationship
given by equations (14) and (18) graphically. Only if the iceberg trade costs are below the
line, transfer pricing (over- or undercharging) will be feasible. The part to the left of the
kink corresponds to the overcharging case, i.e., τf ≤ τd, while the right-hand side gives the
undercharging condition. The depicted relationship is independent of φ, as we assume the
arm’s length price to be equal to 1φ . Clearly, transfer mis-pricing is more feasible the greater
tax differential, as the upper limit of trade cost increases in the right and left tail.
– Figure 1 about here –
Second, firms have to recover the fixed costs. Specifically, in the case of undercharging the
additional profits of transfer pricing less concealment costs and total trade costs must exceed
the fixed costs, FU . Equation (21) states this relationship:
(τf − τd)xUf (pA − PU )− (1− τf )(pA − pU )α(xUU )β − (1− τf )(− 1)xUf pU ≥ FU , (21)
where the first part of the left-hand side (LHS) gives the additional (net) profits due to profit
shifting, the middle part represents the reduction of (net) profits due to the variable costs of
undercharging, and the last part are the (net) additional iceberg transportation costs a firm
faces. Moreover, the LHS increases with φ, thus there is a cutoff value φˆ for which firms will
start to use transfer pricing. i.e., the above inequality holds with equality. We substitute the
optimal undercharging price and import quantities from equation (13) and (16), respectively.
Equation (21) cannot be solved explicitly for φˆ. Using the implicit function theorem, we find
that φˆ, decreases with the tax differential and increases with transportation costs, as well as
fixed costs of transfer pricing.
We use a simple calibration of the model to show how the transfer pricing cutoff productivity,
φˆ, varies with the tax differential, τd − τf , the iceberg trade costs, , and the fixed costs of
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transfer pricing, FU . Table 2 shows the calibration used. As we want to analyze the extensive
margin, we need to parameterize the productivity distribution. We assume that productivity
is Pareto distributed with G(φ) = 1 −
(
1
φ
)k
with shape parameter k = 1.75, which is the
estimate of Eaton et al. (2011). We set the entry costs F and the market size E such that in
the baseline calibration the necessary productivity to enter the market φˆ = 100. The cutoff
for transfer pricing is around 172, which implies that around 38% of the firms that have
entered the market are using transfer pricing.
– Table 2 about here –
Figure 2 shows a numerical responses of the transfer pricing cutoff φˆ and changes of the
extensive margin in terms of percentage of firms that use undercharging conditional on
being in the market. We hold all variables constant using the baseline calibration, and only
vary the variable indicated on the x-axis.
– Figure 2 about here –
The top two graphs show the how the domestic and foreign tax rates change φˆ. As τd in-
creases, i.e., the tax differential decreases, φˆ increases. Although we use τd up to 0.5, the
transportation costs constraint shown in Figure 1 becomes binding before. Moreover, the
share of firms that engage in transfer pricing increases with τd. This seems counter-intuitive,
but recall that the market entry cutoff, φ, increases with τd, and at a much quicker rate than
φˆ.8 As the domestic tax rate raises, less firms enter the market, but more and more firms use
transfer pricing. In the top right graph of Figure 2 we find the relationship that we expect.
As the tax differential increases, τf raises relative to τd, undercharging becomes more and
more profitable, and a lower productivity is needed to engage in it. The bottom left panel
shows the response due to changing iceberg trade costs, holding all other variables constant
at the baseline calibration value. Again, higher transportation costs make transfer pricing
less profitable and the necessary productivity increases. Note that for values  > 1.54, the
constraint depicted in Figure 1 becomes binding and no firm (independent of its productiv-
ity) will be able to use transfer pricing. The last graph relates φˆ to the fixed undercharging
costs to higher fixed costs, FU ,
Corollary
The specific concealment cost function in the model yields some interesting and testable
8Recall that we assume that F is not deductible.
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predictions. Given an interior solution, α > β > 1, and trade costs sufficiently low the
following model predictions arise:
1. The necessary productivity of firms to engage in transfer mis-pricing increases with
the fixed costs of transfer mis-pricing and per piece trade costs, and decreases with the
tax differential.
2. The optimal quantity shipped of transfer mis-priced goods depends negatively on the
iceberg trade costs, and positively on the tax differential.
3. The optimal price wedge is inversely related to the quantity traded, thus more goods
are traded at prices more similar to the arm’s-length price.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Data
We combine several micro-level datasets for Switzerland. First, we use the universe of Swiss
import transactions in the manufacturing sector between 2006 and 2013, provided by the
Swiss Customs Administration. These contain information about the CIF (including cost,
insurance and freight) transaction volumes and quantities, the 8-digit product category, the
country of origin, and the name of both the importer and the exporter. The availability of
volumes and quantities allows us to construct CIF unit values which serve as the proxy for
the transaction-specific mark-up. Note that firms are not identified by a unique identification
number but only based on name and location characteristics, hence a string search algorithm
was applied in order to identify firms. We treated firms with several locations in Switzerland
as separate entities in a first step. The search process was complicated by an undefined
number of firm and location spellings, and it was computationally expensive because of the
large sample size. We have reduced the burden by conditioning on the canton for Swiss firms
and on the country of origin for foreign firms, and by matching strings that shared the same
first character. Next, Stata’s reclink2 command was used to identify pair-relationships, i.e.,
affiliates or parent companies based on the name and country of origin of the importer or
exporter, respectively. As not all affiliated or holding companies carry the same name as the
Swiss firm, this results in conservative estimates throughout the next section. Second, we
have matched these data to information about firm-level characteristics such as the number
of employees, the NACE affiliation, operating revenue and capital stock from Bureau van
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Dijk’s Amadeus database.9 These data are used to calculate log productivity based on Petrin
et al. (2004). The free variables are log wage and log age, the proxy we use is the import
volume, capital is taken from the balance sheet, and we use gross operating turnover as the
dependent variable.10 As the information about Swiss firms is relatively scarce, we use this
match to analyze the response to the tax wedge in terms of extensive and intensive margins
of interest. We use the universe of our import dataset for further counterfactual analysis
later on. Third, we use the cantonal corporate profit tax rates summarized in section 3,
which are matched to the canton the importer is located in. Fourth, we use comprehensive
data for corporate profit tax rates in 79 countries between 1996 and 2013 as described in
Egger et al. (2015). For the corporate profit tax rate we use the maximum corporate profit
tax rate in a country and year.
– Figure 3 about here –
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the aforementioned tax rate for each year in the data,
using whisker-plots. The area around the median (a horizontal bar) indicated by a box refers
to the interquartile range (IQR), whereas the extended lines, the whiskers, indicate values
within a maximum of 1.5 times the IQR. The corporate profit tax rates in Figure 3 show a
relatively high degree of variability over time, even at the median.
– Table 3 about here –
Next, we provide summary statistics about the data used for empirical analysis in Table 3.
We have collapsed the data at the level of the firm, the exporter firm, the country of origin,
product code (by HS 8-digit industry), as well as year for a preliminary analysis. This also
reduces the noise inherent in an analysis based on the use of every single import transaction
as recorded by the customs office. The resulting number of observations amounts to nearly 10
million. We observe slightly more than 100 thousand firms, importing more than 8 thousand
products from more than 750 thousand exporter firms located in 143 countries, in 8 years.
Moments of the data are summarized in the upper panel of the table. More than 6 percent
of observations refer to intra-firm imports. Finally, the (absolute) average tax differential
amounts to 10 percent, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 40 percent. Note that
9Alternatively, we have tried to match this sample with information about firm ownership from Bureau
van Dijk’s Orbis database, however this resulted in a very small number of matches (around 50).
10We have calculated productivities differently (according to the Ackerberg et al. (2015) and Gandhi et al.
(2016) methods) to check the sensitivity of the results later on. The corresponding results were unchanged.
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we have disregarded observations where the country of origin offers a lower tax rate, as the
number of countries is negligible.11
5.2 Estimation
5.3 Reduced form estimation
The first part of the empirical strategy is related to Davies et al. (2014) and Cristea and
Nguyen (2016). Precisely, we are interested in testing the predictions obtained in section
4 by way of reduced form regressions. As described in the previous section, the unit of
observation is an import transaction, specific to the import of a good in product category g
by importer firm i (located in canton d) from exporting firm j (located in origin country f)
in year t.12 The notation illustrates that the data used is novel in its degree of detail, as we
can observe import pair-relationships at the product level, and exploit variation in regional
taxes in addition to the one in countries of origin. The price baseline regression is estimated
as follows:
pijgt = γ1MNEijgt + θipfdt+ (22)
where pijpt is the log import price for each transaction of good p between firm i located in
a Swiss canton d, and a foreign firm j located in a country f , MNEijpt is a binary variable
which equals one if the transaction is intra-firm and zero if it is an arm’s length transaction,
, and νijgt is the disturbance term. The fixed effect θipfdt, ηipj , λfd, κft, and pipt remove
the bias from unobserved firm-product-origin-canton-time factors that affect prices (e.g.,
productivity, or average, time-invariant product-origin prices paid by a firm). Essentially
we are using the variation of different transactions within a firm for a given product, origin
country and year. Thus, we compare the prices of product p between a firm in canton d with
a foreign firm in country f , where the firm is either affiliate or not.
The equation for log import quantities and volumes can be written analogously to (22).
Next we can adapt estimation of equation (22) to be based on the data containing firm-level
information from Amadeus. This leads to an equation which differs from (22) in the inclusion
11Nevertheless, it is perfectly feasible to include those observations, see also Cristea (2015).
12Because i is specific to d, and j to f , we simplify the notation accordingly.
17
of log productivity and takes the following form:
pijpt =δ1MNEijpt ×∆τfdt + δ2MNEijt × φit + δ3∆τfdt ×MNEijtτfdt × φit
+µi + χft + ψpt + σfd + εijpt,
(23)
where φit is log productivity, and εijpt is the disturbance term. This equation includes
two interaction terms. In order to remove endogeneity bias, we further control for firm,
canton-origin, origin-time and product-time fixed effects, but need to neglect firm-time spe-
cific general factors in order to be able to identify the effect of productivity. With these
data at hand we can verify the predictions derived in section 4, about firm-level factors that
determine intensive and extensive margin transfer-pricing patterns. The equations for log
quantity and log volume can be stated analogously.
5.4 Structural estimation
As a final step, we are interested in the parameters α and β of the concealment cost function,
which allows us to perform counter-factual analysis. The theoretical model allows us to
identify relationships that pin down these parameters, i.e., equations (15) and (19). We take
logs of the aforementioned equations which yields
log(xUf ) =
1
β − 1 log
(
1− τf − (1− τd)
1− τf
)
− α− 1
β − 1 log(pA − pU ) + u, (24)
which can be used to identify α and β. Note that we need the deviation from the competitive
price, 1/φ− pU , to estimate the parameters. We construct the price wedge from the reduced
form regression using the MNEijpt interaction to compute the firm-specific price wedge. We
use iceberg trade costs from Egger (2014).
5.5 Results
We report estimates from the estimation of equation (23) in Table 4. The first three columns
report estimates for first-order effects, while columns 4–6 allow for both the first- and second-
order effects that we have derived in Section 4 by including interaction effects between the
intra-firm dummy, the tax differential, and log productivity variables. The results may be
summarized as follows: Using the extensive fixed effects in columns 1–3, we find that within
firm transactions are under-priced on average by about 12%, but firms trade significantly
more in terms of quantity and volume. Columns 4–6 square with the theory predictions. The
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sign of the coefficient on the tax differential (for intra-firm imports) is negative regarding
prices, and positive regarding quantities and volumes. This implies that firms mis-price their
transfers by undercharging, and they do so more intensively, as the tax differential becomes
larger. They also ship larger quantities and volumes as the tax wedge increases.
Next, the coefficient on productivity carries a positive sign regarding price and volume and
is insignificant for quantity. Thus, more productive firms deviate less from the arms’ length
price put use more volume to shift profits, which is consistent with out theory. As productiv-
ity increases, the firm can also import larger amounts of foreign inputs without cannibalizing
the monopoly mark-up, such that pA falls. Consequently, pA − pU raises as the firm faces a
price wedge-quantity trade-off. If many firms are at a corner solution, i.e., they cannot shift
more profits without decreasing their profits at home, the quantity is given by equation (20)
and would expect insiginificant effects for the quantity regression.
Thus over all our results imply that more productive firms deviate less from the ALP while
shipping higher volumes, which is in line with concealment costs (and also trade costs),
making profit shifting costly.
An estimation of the universe of import transactions will allow us to estimate (24) in a next
step.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a theoretical model of transfer pricing. Firms that shift
profits to low tax destinations face concealment costs and trade costs. The fixed part of the
concealment cost function as well as the trade costs limit the number of firms (or possible
location of firms) that are able to use transfer pricing. The specific functional form of the
concealment cost function drives the intensive margin, i.e., the elasticity of the price wedge
and the quantity of goods shipped. We find that the profits shifted increase with firm
productivity, i.e., more productive firms deviate less from the arms’ length price and ship a
larger quantity of goods. Our theoretical model is consistent with empirical findings from
reduced form estimations using Swiss transaction-level import data, as well as data about
firm-level productivity. Finally, the theoretical model allows to estimate a theory-consistent
concealment cost function which can be used for counterfactual analysis. Our findings are
consistent with compliance (Jost et al., 2010; Bauer and Langenmayr, 2013; Becker and
Davies, 2014; Rathke, 2015) or managerial incentives frameworks (Baldenius et al., 2004;
Koethenbuerger and Stimmelmayr, 2015).
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Tables and figures
Figure 1: Condition for  to ensure transfer pricing.
1
∆𝜏𝜏
𝜖𝜖
UnderchargingOvercharging
No Transfer pricing
0
Note: We fix τd = 0.5 and only vary τf . We assume that α = 0.75 and β = 0.25. For  above the line,
transfer pricing is not feasible for firms, independent of their productivity.
Figure 2: Condition for  to ensure transfer pricing.
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Figure 3: Corporate profit tax. 79 countries, 1996 - 2011
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Note: For corporate profit taxes, we utilize the maximum tax rate levied at the national level on
corporate profit in a country of residence. In federal states, the total corporate tax rate is calculated
as the weighted average of the local (sub-national) taxes combined with federal tax rates (e.g., for
Germany or Canada as reported by the OECD) or the tax rate prevailing in the economic center
(e.g. for Switzerland, where the rates of the canton of Zurich are taken). The primary sources for
corporate profit tax rates are the following: Ernest and Young Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide 1998-
2012; Coopers and Lybrand International Tax Summaries 1996-1997; International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation Global Corporate Tax Handbook 2007-2012; Price Waterhouse Coopers Corporate Taxes
- Worldwide Summaries 1999-2000, 2001-2003, 2012-2013; OECD www.taxfoundation.org.
Table 1: Corporate tax rates in Switzerland
Lucerne 12.32 St. Gallen 17.40
Nidwalden 12.66 Aargau 19.17
Obwalden 12.66 Fribourg 19.86
Appenzell A. 13.04 Ticino 20.67
Appenzell I. 14.16 Basle-Land 20.70
Zug 14.60 Jura 20.77
Schwyz 14.86 Zurich 21.15
Uri 15.12 Valais 21.57
Glarus 15.71 Berne 21.64
Schaffhausen 16.04 Solothurn 21.85
Thurgau 16.43 Basle 22.18
Grisons 16.68 Vaud 22.79
Neuchâtel 17.01 Geneva 24.16
Notes: Maximum effective federal/cantonal/municipal pre-tax rate at the cantonal capital in % in Switzerland. Corpo-
rate tax rates 2015 (2014 for Berne, Fribourg, Geneva, Lucerne, Thurgau, Uri), Source: Clarity on Swiss Taxes 2015,
KPMG Switzerland.
Table 2: Calibration
Variable Baseline Variation
Domestic tax rate τd 0.3 [0,0.3]
Foreign tax rate τf 0.5 [0.3,1]
Price wedge elasticity α 0.75
Quantity elasticity β 0.25
Iceberg trade costs  1.1 [1,1.6]
Fixed entry costs F 0.01
Fixed undercharging costs FU 0.001 [0,0.01]
Market size E 0.249
Pareto parameter k 1.75
Notes: Parameters used in the baseline simulation and the responses. We assume that the productivity is Pareto
distributed with c.d.f.: G(φ) = 1−
(
1
φ
)k. F and E were chosen such that in the baseline calibration φ = 100.
Table 3: Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Log price 3.676 1.991 -11.225 22.225
Log quantity 3.434 3.023 -6.908 20.572
Log volume 7.109 2.599 0 21.904
φit 7.337 1.419 -0.062 15.773
∆τfdt 10.297 4.431 0.026 39.750
MNEijt 0.063 0.243 0 1
No Firms 102,668
No Products 8,141
No Exporter 753,274
No Origins 143
No Years 8
Observations 9,654,916
Notes: The summary statistics correspond to data pooled over the period 2006-2015 for import transactions obtained
from the Swiss Customs Administration. Log price was calculated as the log of volume divided by quantity. The data
correspond to a match of trade transactions data with Amadeus firm-level data from Bureau van Dijk. Log φit is
calculated according to Petrin et al. (2004).
Table 4: Price, quantity and volume regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price Quantity Volume Price Quantity Volume
MNE -0.118∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.019) (0.032) (0.029)
1.ltau_fd 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
1.omega -0.024∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
1.mneXltau_fd -0.002∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001)
1.mneXlnomega 0.032∗∗∗ -0.005 0.027∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Obs. 4,749,672 4,749,672 4,749,672 3,576,624 3,576,624 3,576,624
No. ipfdt 1,449,636 1,449,636 1,449,636
No. i 44,224 44,224 44,224
No. ft 799 799 799
No. pt 39,517 39,517 39,517
No. fd 1,523 1,523 1,523
R2 0.825 0.793 0.767 0.638 0.554 0.485
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All equations are estimated
by OLS with robust standard errors and dependent variables in logs.
A Expected fines of tax evasion
In this section we derive the proposed concealment cost functions in equations (1) and (2)
from the optimal behavior of a tax authority that maximizes expected tax revenues. Without
loss of generality we focus only on the undercharging case. Deriving the concealment cost
function for the overcharging case follows analogously. The tax authority decides how many
revenue officers it wants to employ to audit a parent firm given some ex-ante observable
variables. The detection probability of illegal transfer pricing increases with the price wedge
between the competitive arm’s length price and the undercharging price. Both taken as
given from the perspective of the tax authority. Moreover, the probability increases (for a
given price wedge) with the number of revenue officers are employed at the audit of the firm.
We assume that the tax authority randomly audit firms, but a firm is selected for an audit
the tax authority can costlessly observe the price wedge and the traded quantity. Still the
tax authority has to confirm that the firm indeed applies illegal transfer pricing. Thus, the
expected tax revenues, ET , from an audit are
ET =
(
L(pA − pU )ς
L(pA − pU )ς + 1
)
(τf (pA − pU )xfϕ)− wL, (25)
where the first parenthesis gives the detection probability as a function of revenue officers
employed, the price wedge, and an elasticity parameter ς > 0. The second parenthesis
corresponds to the evaded tax revenues multiplied by a fine markup, ϕ > 1, and wL are the
wage costs of revenue officers.
The optimal amount of tax officers is given by
L(pA − pU )ς + 1 =
(
τfxϕ(pA − pU )ς+1
w
) 1
2
. (26)
Assume that the probability of a firm to get audited is LML , where L is the (inelastic)
total number of tax officers at the tax authority and M is the total number of firms in the
economy that the tax authority could audit. Then the expected fine from the perspective
can be written as
EΠ =
L
ML
L(pA − pU )ς
L(pA − pU )ς + 1τf (pA − pU )xfϕ =
L
M
(xϕτf )
1
2 (pA − pU )
ς+1
2 , (27)
where we substituted the optimal number of tax officers from equation (26). This is equiv-
alent to the concealment costs function in equation (1), scaled by LM (ϕτf )
1
2 , and β = ς+12 ,
and α = 12 .
B Overcharging MNE
If the tax rate in the domestic country is higher than in the foreign country τd > τf , firms
have incentives to shift profits to the foreign country and thus the foreign affiliate overcharges
the domestic firm, pO > 1/φ. Total net profits are
piO(ω) =(1− τd)
(
p(ω)y(ω)− xd
φ
− pOxf
)
+ (1− τf )
(
pO − 1
φ
)
xf
−(1− τd)(pO − pA)αxβf )− FO − F.
(28)
The first order conditions of the firm’s maximization problem are:
∂piO(ω)
∂xd
=E − 2(xd + xf )− 1
φ
= 0,
∂piO(ω)
∂xf
=(1− τd)(E − 2(xd + xf )− pO) + (1− τf )
(
pO − 1
φ
)
− (1− τd)βxβ−1f (pO − pA)α = 0,
∂piO(ω)
∂pO
=− (1− τd)xf + (1− τf )xf − (1− τd)α(pO − pA)α−1xβf = 0
Solving for the optimal pO yields
pO =
β
β − α
(
pA +
α
β
τd − τf
φζ
)
. (29)
Note that the overcharging price is higher than the arms’ length price if ζ ≤ 0. This is the
case if
 <
1− τf
1− τd , (30)
where the RHS is greater than one as τd > τf . Similarly to the undercharging case trans-
portation costs limit transfer pricing if the tax differential is too small.
Similar to the undercharging case we derive the comparative statics for overcharging:
∂pO/∂φ < 0, ∂pO/∂ < 0,
∂pO/∂τf < 0, ∂pO/∂τd > 0, ∂2pU/∂τf∂φ > 0,
where we use that for pA = 1φ , α > β and ζ < 0 to ensure that pO >
1
φ . In the overcharging
case high-productivity firms increase the transfer price less than low-productivity firms.
Solving for xf yields
xOf =
( (1− τf )− (1− τd)
(1− τd)α(pO − pA)α−1
) 1
β−1
. (31)
Again substituting pO from equation (17) yields the equilibrium traded quantity:
xOf =
 −ζ
(1− τf )α
(
α
α−β
(
pA + τd−τfφζ)
))α−1

1
β−1
. (32)
Again, bigger firms trade more goods at a smaller price differential relative to the competitive
price. Moreover, ∂xOf /∂τd > 0 and ∂xOf /∂τf < 0, which implies that a higher tax difference
leads to increased imports of the over-priced foreign inputs. The cutoff productivity can be
determined analogously to the undercharging case.
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation
Working Paper series recent papers
WP18/10 Travis Chow, Jeffrey L Hoopes and Edward L Maydew US Firms on Foreign (tax)
Holidays
WP18/09 Claudio Agostini, Juan Pablo Atal and Andrea Repetto Firms Response to Tax
Enforcement through Audits
WP18/08 Mazhar Waseem Information, Asymmetric Incentives or Withholding?
Understanding the Self-Enforcement of Value-Added-Tax
WP18/07 Matthew Smith, Danny Yagan, Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick Capitalists in the
twenty-first century
WP18/06 Daniel Shaviro The new non-territorial U.S international tax system
WP18/05 Eric M Zolt Tax Treaties and Developing Countries
WP18/04 Anne Brockmeyer, Marco Hernandez, Stewart Kettle and Spencer Smith Casting a
wider tax net: Experimental evidence from Costa Rica
WP18/03 Ruud de Mooij and Li Liu At a cost:the real effects of transfer pricing regulations
WP18/02 Rita de la Feria Tax fraud and the rule of law
WP18/01 Eddy Hiu Fung Tam Behavioural response to time notches in transaction tax:
Evidence from stamp duty in Hong Kong and Singapore
WP17/19 Michael P. Devereux, Giorgia Maffini and Jing Xing Corporate tax incentives &
capital structure: New evidence from UK firm-level tax returns
WP17/18 Sarah Clifford Taxing Multinationals beyond borders: financial and locational
responses to CFC rules
WP17/17 Dominik von Hagen and Axel Prettl Controlled foreign corporation rules and cross-
border M&A activity
WP17/16 Marie Lamensch Destination based taxation of corporate profits - preliminary
findings regarding tax collection in cross-border situations
WP17/15 Li Liu Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr and Dongxian Guo International transfer pricing and tax
avoidance: Evidence from linked trade-tax statistics in the UK.
WP17/14 Katarzyna Habu How much tax do companies pay in the UK?
WP17/13 Katarzyna Habu How aggressive are foreign multinational companies in reducing
their corporation tax liability?
WP17/12 Edward D. Kleinbard The right tax at the right time
WP17/11 Aaron Flaaen The role of transfer prices in profit-shifting by U.S. multinational
firms: Evidence from the 2004 Homeland Investment Act
WP17/10 Ruud de Mooij and Li Liu At a cost: The real effect of transfer pricing regulations
on multinational investments
WP17/09 Wei Cui Taxation without information: The institutional foundations of modern tax
collection
WP17/08 John Brooks The definitions of income
WP17/07 Michael P. Devereux and John Vella Implications of Digitalization for International
Corporation Tax Reform
WP17/06 Richard Collier and Michael P. Devereux The Destination–Based Cash Flow Tax and
the Double Tax Treaties
WP17/05 Li Liu Where does multinational investment go with Territorial Taxation
WP17/04 Wiji Arulampalam, Michael P Devereux and Federica Liberini Taxes and Location
of Targets
WP17/03 Johannes Becker and Joachim Englisch A European Perspective on the US plans for
a Destination based cash flow tax
WP17/02 Andreas Haufler, Mohammed Mardan and Dirk Schindler Double tax
discrimination to attract FDI and fight profit shifting: The role of CFC rules
WP17/01 Alan Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux, Michael Keen and John Vella Destination-
based cash flow taxation
WP16/14 Anzhela Cédelle The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive: A UK Perspective
WP16/13 Michael Devereux Measuring corporation tax uncertainty across countries:
Evidence from a cross-country survey
WP16/12 Andreas Haufler and Ulf Maier Regulatory competition in capital standards with
selection effects among banks
WP16/11 Katarzyna Habu Are financing constraints binding for investment? Evidence from
natural experiment
WP 16/10 Li Liu and Ben Lockwood VAT notches, voluntary registration and bunching:
Theory and UK evidence
WP 16/09 Harry Grubert and Roseanne Altshuler Shifting the burden of taxation from the
corporate to the personal level and getting the corporate tax rate down to 15 percent
WP 16/08 Margaret K McKeehan and George R Zodrow Balancing act: weighing the factors
affecting the taxation of capital income in a small open economy
WP 16/07 Michael P Devereux and Li Liu Stimulating investment through incorporation
WP 16/06 Stephen R Bond and Irem Guceri R&D and productivity: Evidence from large UK
establishments with substantial R&D activities
WP16/05 Tobias Böhm, Nadine Riedel and Martin Simmler Large and influential: firm size
and governments’ corporate tax rate choice?
WP16/04 Dhammika Dharmapala The economics of corporate and business tax reform
WP 16/03 Rita de la Feria EU VAT principles as interpretative aids to EU VAT rules: the
inherent paradox
WP 16/02 Irem Guceri Will the real R&D employees please stand up? Effects of tax breaks on
firm level outcomes
WP 16/01 Giorgia Maffini, Jing Xing and Michael P Devereux The impact of investment
incentives: evidence from UK corporation tax returns
WP 15/33 Anzhela Cédelle Enhanced co-operation: a way forward for tax harmonisation in
the EU?
WP 15/32 James Mahon and Eric Zwick Do experts help firms optimise?
WP 15/31 Robin Boadway, Motohiro Sato and Jean-François Tremblay Cash-flow business
taxation revisited: bankruptcy, risk aversion and asymmetric information
WP 15/30 Martin Simmler Do multinational firms invest more? On the impact of internal
debt financing and transfer pricing on capital accumulation
WP 15/29 Daniel Shaviro The crossroads versus the seesaw: getting a 'fix' on recent
international tax policy developments
WP 15/28 Zhonglan Dai, Douglas A Shackelford, Yue (Layla) Ying and Harold H Zhang Do
companies invest more after shareholder tax cuts?
WP 15/27 Martin Ruf and Julia Schmider Who bears the cost of taxing the rich? An
empirical study on CEO pay
WP 15/26 Eric Orhn The corporate investment response to the domestic production
activities deduction
WP 15/25 Li Liu International taxation and MNE investment: evidence from the UK change
to territoriality
WP 15/24 Edward D Kleinbard Reimagining capital income taxation
WP 15/23 James R Hines Jr, Niklas Potrafke, Marina Riem and Christoph Schinke Inter vivos
transfers of ownership in family firms
WP 15/22 Céline Azémar and Dhammika Dharmapala Tax sparing agreements, territorial tax
reforms, and foreign direct investment
WP 15/21 Wei Cui A critical review of proposals for destination-based cash-flow corporate
taxation as an international tax reform option
WP 15/20 Andrew Bird and Stephen A Karolyi Governance and taxes: evidence from
regression discontinuity
WP 15/19 Reuven Avi-Yonah Reinventing the wheel: what we can learn from the Tax Reform
Act of 1986
WP 15/18 Annette Alstadsæter, Salvador Barrios, Gaetan Nicodeme, Agnieszka Maria
Skonieczna and Antonio Vezzani Patent boxes design, patents, location and local R&D
WP 15/17 Laurent Bach Do better entrepreneurs avoid more taxes?
WP 15/16 Nadja Dwenger, Frank M Fossen and Martin Simmler From financial to real
economic crisis: evidence from individual firm–bank relationships in Germany
WP 15/15 Giorgia Maffini and John Vella Evidence-based policy-making? The Commission's
proposal for an FTT
WP 15/14 Clemens Fuest and Jing Xing How can a country 'graduate' from procyclical fiscal
policy? Evidence from China?
WP 15/13 Richard Collier and Giorgia Maffini The UK international tax agenda for business
and the impact of the OECD BEPS project
WP 15/12 Irem Guceri and Li Liu Effectiveness of fiscal incentives for R&D: quasi-
experimental evidence
WP 15/11 Irem Guceri Tax incentives and R&D: an evaluation of the 2002 UK reform using
micro data
WP 15/10 Rita de la Feria and Parintira Tanawong Surcharges and penalties in UK tax law
WP 15/09 Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud de Mooij, Michael Keen Base erosion, profit-shifting and
developing countries
WP 15/08 Judith Freedman Managing tax complexity: the institutional framework for tax
policy-making and oversight
WP 15/07 Michael P Devereux, Giorgia Maffini and Jing Xing Corporate tax incentives and
capital structure: empirical evidence from UK tax returns
WP 15/06 Li Liu and Ben Lockwood VAT notches
WP 15/05 Clemens Fuest and Li Liu Does ownership affect the impact of taxes on firm
behaviour? Evidence from China.
WP 15/04 Michael P Devereux, Clemens Fuest and Ben Lockwood The taxation of foreign
profits: a unified view
WP 15/03 Jitao Tang and Rosanne Altshuler The spillover effects of outward foreign direct
investment on home countries: evidence from the United States
WP 15/02 Juan Carlos Suarez Serrato and Owen Zidar Who benefits from state corporate tax
cuts? A local labour markets approach with heterogeneous firms
WP 15/01 Ronald B Davies, Julien Martin, Mathieu Parenti and Farid Toubal Knocking on Tax
Haven’s Door: multinational firms and transfer pricing
